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Abstract
This paper analyzes the political risks of Chinese 
enterprises’ investment in the US with uncertainty 
of the current world economy. The political risks are 
mainly reflected by adjustments in the US strategy 
toward China that show duality and asymmetry of the 
cooperative containment, which will become the source 
that most profoundly and frequently influences Chinese 
enterprises’ investment in the US. However, because 
of the complementary factor endowments and special 
political status of the two countries, there is a huge space 
for their economic and trade cooperation. Thus, simple 
business practice like Chinese enterprises’ investment 
in the US should be de-politicized as much as possible. 
Therefore, we need to study the US investment policy-
making process and seek countermeasures according to 
current world’s political and economic circumstance and 
specific situation of domestic enterprises, thereby creating 
favorable policies of Chinese enterprise’s investment in 
the US and reducing the political risks.
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INTRODUCTION
After the subprime crisis, the recovery of world’s economy 
remains slow. New economies such as the BRICS, 
including China, are facing the pressure of economic 
downturn. The uncertainty of the world economic 
development is rising. Because of the weak internal force 
of domestic economic development, many countries, 
including the U.S., adjust their foreign strategies, enhance 
interventions on domestic market. The re-rise of trade and 
investment protectionism creates huge political obstacles 
for foreign trade and transnational investment, and brings 
unpredictable risks to Chinese enterprises’ investment 
in the US. Political risks in international investments are 
featured by wide coverage, strong influences, changeable 
complexity and greatest threat, which worth high attention 
and careful research for us to take effective actions to 
prevent and control them (Wang & Liu, 2012).
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
As China’s investment in the US enlarges rapidly, there 
are more and more studies on political risks of Chinese 
enterprises’ investment in the US by domestic and foreign 
scholars from different perspectives.
Marchick, an expert in US international investment 
and national security points out that Chinese enterprises 
investing in the US are mostly government-owned or 
controlled, and the investment is mainly concentrated on 
areas where China has a comparative advantage, such 
as industries like manufacturing and strategic assets like 
energy, by which Chinas seeks to develop management 
skills and international brand with global competitiveness. 
This may easily raise questions that China’s investment 
in the US is out of business benefits or national interests, 
and have the US government concerned with national 
security (Marchick, 2006). American scholar Deng 
Ping contends that Chinese enterprises’ transnational 
merger and acquisition is a way to obtain strategic assets, 
which matches the logic of China’s unique political 
system environment (Deng, 2009). American scholars 
Goloberman and Canadian scholar Shapiro observes 
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that US policymakers are increasingly concerned about 
the impact of foreign investment from China. American 
companies are criticized because being Chinese mergers 
and acquisitions benefits less than Greenfield investment 
and other reasons such non-commercial mergers and 
acquisitions (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). American 
scholar Moran uses Chinese acquisitions of US companies 
as examples and analyzes the criteria and political factors 
that influence CFIUS review on China’s mergers and 
acquisitions involving key industries (Moran, 2009). 
Evans and Downs (2006), and Prabhakar (2009) do some 
case studies respectively on the Congress and the extent 
of the nationalization of acquirer-enterprises, pointing 
out the political tendentiousness toward China in the US 
national security review. Besides, according to the US 
consulting firm Roddy Graham’s research report, the 
main obstacles that prevent China from investing the US 
infrastructure and high-technology industries are the US 
political factors.
By studying the US pressing the RMB appreciation, 
Chinese scholar Wang Shuguang points out that the US 
has obvious political strategies and pursuit of interests. 
The US short-term goal is to quell the political pressure at 
home and abroad and make China a “scapegoat”. Its mid-
term goal is to find a payer for its economic adjustment 
and development. And its long-term goal is to find a victim 
to maintain its hegemony (Wang, 2005). International 
trade and international investment are the two aspects of 
international economic and trade activities, Su Jingxiang 
studies China’s non-market economy status, noting 
that this is a result of the blending US domestic politics 
and international politics, which protects its domestic 
interests in all aspects, and ensures that the country will 
not depart from the general direction of international 
affairs (Su, 2004). According to Song Guoyou, the US 
stresses relative benefits on the political issues of China, 
while stressing absolute benefits in its economic strategy 
toward China (Song, 2004). Huang Yiling points out that 
political factors such as US Congress, interest groups and 
ideology can cause political risks in the security review of 
Chinese enterprises’ mergers and acquisitions in the US 
(Huang, 2013). Hua Qiongfei believes the competitive 
relations between China and the US in economy, security 
and politic is the root of the political risks. And the US 
concern that Chinese enterprises and the political system 
and values spread by China’s state-owned enterprises may 
threaten its hegemony and developing mode increases the 
political risks (Hua, 2013). Though their empirical test, 
Han Jian and Xu Xiujun found that American partisan 
political leanings have a significant impact on regions 
and entry mode of Chinese enterprises’ investment in 
the US. Also, with given market size, labor costs, taxes, 
trade scale and other factors, Chinese companies will give 
priority to states with higher support rate of Democratic 
Party (Han & Xu, 2014).
We can see that foreign scholars mainly focus on 
studying Chinese political system and its purpose 
of investment in the US, pointing out that Chinese 
enterprises’ investment in the US poses a threat to 
national security. These studies give the US foreign 
investment policy-making excuse, and influence CFIUS’s 
national security review which has an obvious political 
tendency, therefore inevitably increasing political risks 
of Chinese enterprises’ investment in the US. In contrast, 
Chinese scholars study mainly from the perspective of 
international political economics, pointing out that the 
root causing the political risks of Chinese enterprises’ 
investment in the US is US political strategy, economic 
interests and its demands of absolute advantage in China-
US competition in international politics, economy, 
security, and so on, and that the political tendency of 
the US national security review is just an external form. 
Thus, from a new perspective, this paper analyzes how 
the political risks of Chinese enterprises’ investment in 
the US generate, adjustments of the US strategy toward 
China and the decisive factors, and puts forward specific 
strategies, therefore serving as a useful complement of 
studies in this field.
2.  POLITICAL RISKS OF CHINESE 
ENTERPRISES’ INVESTMENT IN THE US
2.1  Political Risks in International Investment
Political risks refer to the possibility of international 
investors’ economic loss led by political events in the host 
country or significant changes in the political relations 
between the host country, investor country and the third 
country (Nie, 2011).
2.2  Causes of Political Risks
Causes of political risks in international investments 
are very complicated. Outside the host country, 
international economic and financial crisis, changes in 
the world political and economic situation, economic 
regional blocs, and adjustments of agreements between 
relevant international organizations and bilateral and 
multilateral agreements can lead to political risks in 
varying degree. Inside the host country, conflicts between 
goals of international corporations and the host country 
government, and conflicts between laws and regulations in 
the host country and international corporations’ operation 
are main causes of the political risks in international 
investments (Nie, 2011).
2.3  Motives of Investment in the US
Since 1972 when the “Shanghai Communiqué” was 
signed, the world has witnessed great achievements in 
China-US trade. By the end of 2013, China has become 
the world’s largest trading power, the second largest 
foreign investor and the third largest FDI country. Also, 
MAO Kaifeng (2015). 
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China has become America’s largest creditor nation 
(2008), the second largest trading partner (2005), and the 
third largest exports destination and the primary source 
of imports. The US remains the world’s largest foreign 
investor and FDI country and China’s second largest 
trading partner.
Although China-US trade develops rapidly, meanwhile 
China-US investment appears limited. Despite the rapid 
increase in China-to-US investment in recent years and 
the fact that the China-to-US investment last year has 
surpassed the US-to-China investment, the total amount 
was merely over 20 billion dollars. Over the same period, 
the US-to-China investment was only over 70 billion 
dollars. This is disproportionate with the China-US 
economic position in the world and their huge trade with 
each other. The imbalanced investment and the small 
mutual stock will lead to an imbalanced trade between 
the two countries, and affect the China-US political 
development and even the world’s political development.
According to data of the Central Bank, as of the end 
of June 2014, China’s foreign exchange reserves was 
up to $4 trillion, accounting for one third of the world’s 
total foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile, according 
to the latest data of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, as of the end of 2013, Chinese short-term debt 
amounted to 4.1252 trillion yuan, about $671.8 billion. 
This shows that China now has about 3 to 3.3 trillion 
dollars, far more than the liquidity requirements needed 
for utilizing foreign exchange reserves (Liu, 2014). A 
huge amount of excess foreign exchange reserves, besides 
making necessary foreign debt purchase, requires the 
diversification of foreign investment, and the US is one of 
the best target countries.
2.4  Political Risks in Investment in the US
Out of enterprises’ strategic objectives, or the need for 
increasing the value of assets, Chinese enterprises invest 
in US through Greenfield investments, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions and other ways, which bring new 
increases and opportunities for the US to absorb foreign 
investment.
However, due to different ideologies, values, and 
social systems, although gaps brought by these differences 
has been narrowed and situation has improved, Chinese 
enterprises cause some unease for certain political powers 
in the US. By affecting the adjustment of the US strategy 
toward China and legislation of China-related investment 
policy, these political powers keep creating various topics, 
and intervene and restrict Chinese enterprises’ investment 
in every possible way. These political risks become 
the source of negative effects on Chinese enterprises’ 
investment in the US.
On one hand, the national security review of the 
Committee of Foreign Investment in United States 
(CFIUS) has created some obstacles for the Chinese 
enterprises’ investment in the US. The national security 
review of CFIUS covers twelve areas, which is apparently 
unfavorable for Chinese enterprises coming into the US, 
out of the consideration of political factors. First, the 
US utilities and infrastructure sectors, second, the US 
technology export control policy, and third, US energy 
projects are still on high alert against China. Besides 
restrictions on enterprises and key technologies, Chinese 
enterprises are required to keep anti-terrorism along 
with US, and the investigation on synergistic strategy is 
increasing. Because of a lack of transparency of CFIUS 
security review on foreign acquisitions and mutual 
restrictions between departments, they are biased against 
Chinese state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth 
funds investing in the US. Thus, the simple-motivated 
business practices are politicalized, which inevitably hurt 
Chinese enterprises’ confidence and enthusiasm, as well 
as US-China investment relations.
On the other hand, US often carry out national 
security review with “political label” by using the reason 
that China’s investment in US may pose a threat to US 
national security. The US government usually considers 
that China’s investors are mainly state-owned or state-
holding enterprises that can get subsidized loans from 
state-owned banks and other financial institutions and 
support from government’s policy, and that they hold 
political purposes rather than commercial ones. And in 
this way, this investment in the US is possible to form 
a non-market advantage, resulting in abnormal, unfair 
competition, and even threatening the US national security 
and free competition order.
However, that is not the case. China’s direct investors 
have various forms of ownership. According to statistics 
of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, from 2003 to 
2010, among 230 Chinese investments in the US, there 
are 170 accounting for about 74 percent are from the 
private sector. The “opaque” investment barriers set by 
the US will become a strong countercurrent for Chinese 
enterprises to invest in the US. In addition, some US 
restrictive policies towards foreign investment, such 
as antitrust laws and protectionist provisions such as 
the federal government’s “Buy American Products”, as 
well as some political activities such as campaign and 
conflicts between congress and government, often hype 
China’s trade, investment, exchange rates, government 
procurement, network security, intellectual property and 
other issues (Zhang, 2012).
3.  ADJUSTMENTS OF THE US STRATEGY 
TOWARD CHINA
Political risks of Chinese enterprises’ investment in the 
US are mainly reflected in the adjustment of the US 
strategy toward China. Chinese enterprises’ investment in 
the US was greatly influenced by adjustments of the US 
strategy toward China. The US strategy toward China has 
begun to be featured by cooperative containment (Wang, 
2010).
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3.1  Cooperative Containment of the US Strategy 
Toward China
Since the PRC was established, the US strategy toward 
China has experienced stages of containment, cooperation 
and containment, and now shows a feature of cooperative 
containment.
3.1.1  Two Sides of the US Strategy Toward China
Two sides refer to the combination of continuation and 
adjustment of competition and cooperation. First, after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the civil turmoil, the 
US contained China by using Tibet, Taiwan, human rights 
and other issues to provoke China’s internal nationalism 
and social issues, and by using support from China’s 
neighboring countries to create conflicts and interfere 
China’s peaceful rise. All these are continuation of the US 
strategy toward the Soviet Union.
In addition, to maintain its global hegemony, the US 
maintains a different level of cooperation with China. Its 
motives is not to help China’s development, but to gain 
benefits by getting involved in China’s development, and 
to place China into its development system in order to 
achieve its leading edge.
3.1.2  Asymmetry of the US Strategy Toward China
The US development in modern times determines its 
hegemony in international politics, which is the realistic 
foundation of the asymmetry of the US strategy toward 
China. In terms of China-US trade, China depends 
more on the US than the US does on China. And in the 
competition with China, the US always has a sense of 
superiority.
In the realistic China-US interaction, the US often 
asks China to change in order to adapt to the US changes. 
Meanwhile, the US always creates disturbances and 
benefits from China’s passive response or defense process. 
In contrast, China always pursues a diplomatic principle 
of “non-intervention in internal affairs” and the diplomatic 
thought of Taoguangyanghui (keeping a low profile) and 
it has no intention to provoke the US and benefits from 
the conflict, so China’s measures to put pressure on the 
US are far less.
Because of the foundation of two sides and asymmetry 
of the US strategy toward China, US frequently benefits 
from its pressuring cooperation strategy toward China, 
and seeks to guide China into its plan.
3.2  Pressuring Cooperation Strategy Toward 
China
In recent years, through China-US political, economic, 
military and cultural dialogue, while promoting limited 
China-US cooperation, the US put pressure on China on 
rules and methods of the cooperation field. For instance, 
when China was trying to join the WTO, the US made 
China makes more concessions and commitments though 
several rounds of negotiation. Second, when enhancing 
China-US trade, the US often accuses the trade deficit, 
while the fact is that the US gains over 20 billion dollars 
every year through the trade deficit. Third, the US set 
restrictions on areas such as national security review and 
key technologies, despite the fact that the US needs China 
to enlarge its investment in the US.
The US pressur ing cooperat ion s t ra tegy use 
cooperation as a condition to force China to make 
concessions, which is a pressuring strategy in the 
framework of cooperation which will not undermine 
the overall theme of cooperation. It not only affects 
China though pressure of external circumstance, but 
also influences even changes China in a close distance, 
as well as wields influences of the US soft power. It can 
be foreseen that in the future China-US interaction, US 
will benefit and ensure its international hegemony by 
intentionally creating tensions and conflicts with China, 
and keeping close interaction with and put pressure on 
China (Wang, 2010).
4.  THE DECISIVE FACTORS OF THE US 
STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA
With the development of economic globalization, the 
US is transforming from an inward-oriented economy 
into an outward-oriented economy. The US economy’s 
dependence on the global economy has increased 
greatly. Meanwhile, the US economic pattern changes 
dramatically, paying more attention on overseas 
economic interests. These changes include the service 
economization, knowledge economization, increasing 
dependence on foreign capital and overseas marketing, and 
other aspects. With major changes in economic pattern, 
the US foreign economic policies pay more attention to 
opening overseas markets, protecting intellectual property, 
and opening overseas financial markets (Wang, 2008).
However, these changes inevitably led to the game 
between domestic interests and foreign interests. Changes 
in a country’s investment policy are determined by its 
decision-making mechanisms of investment policy, and 
decision-making mechanism is deeply influenced and 
intervened by its domestic political factors. In the political 
system of the US, independent and different agencies 
share the power of deciding public policy, and different 
political forces wield their influences.
US domestic policy-making process has two stages: 
First, describing the nature of the policy-making process, 
which can be divided into three stages: agenda-setting, 
adoption and implementation. The three indispensible 
stages influence each other, and ultimately form 
congressional legislation. Second, analyzing factors that 
determine the results of policy, namely consciousness, 
interests and institutions. Interaction of these factors will 
play a role in any political aspect. Powers that influence 
the decisions include Congress, administration, interest 
groups and think tanks.
MAO Kaifeng (2015). 
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4.1  Congress
Congress is the legislative branch. In particular 
operational level, a special committee of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives has a say in making and 
deciding the investment regulatory policies, and covers 
the bill drafting, committee hearings, parliamentarians’ 
debate, supervision on the laws, and other political 
activities of legislative department. Congress often tends 
to support or protect domestic industries, and be relatively 
“aggressive” in dealing with Chinese investment in the 
US on regulatory issues. In Congress, the Republican 
Party tends to support free trade, and has a close relation 
with large enterprises and international corporations, so its 
political opinions often favor the protection of investment 
interests, and pay less attention to other social issues such 
as environmental protection, labor welfare and so on. 
In contrast, the Democratic Party supports investment 
protection. It is close to labor interests and community of 
left-ideology (Zhang, 2009). Radical actions of Congress 
are out of the consideration of votes. Whether senators 
are elected or re-elected, votes from their constituency 
are necessary. Thus, senators should be consistent with 
their voters’ interests when it comes to trade policies that 
involve voters’ sensitive interests. Besides, US senators’ 
tendency to politicalize trade issues is deeply influenced 
by ideological factors (Guo, 2014).
4.2  Administration
The president is the representative of administration. The 
final adjudication of regulatory review on investment is 
extended from the president’s administrative power, so it 
is to some extent restricted by Congress. In ruling China’s 
investment in the US, the president should consider more 
on maintaining national interests and security, and face 
the pressure from voters of certain consistency at the 
same time. In terms of reviewing investment, the US 
government department which is best qualified in Chinese 
affairs should be the CFIUS led by the department of 
Treasury. In terms of policies on China’s investment in the 
US, the president usually listens to opinions of the CFIUS. 
The US Treasury’s power enlarges greatly and it has more 
influence than other departments (Song, 2007).
4.3  Interest Groups
Interest groups are actors of the US investment policy-
making process which cannot be ignored. They mainly 
include different industry groups, labor unions and NGO. 
US political system allows the existence of interest 
groups. In the game between legislative and executive 
branch, the interest groups’ influence gradually appears. 
Interest groups exert its influence on investment policies 
mainly through direct lobbying, lobbyists and other ways, 
among which lobbying is the major method. Besides 
lobbying, interest groups also influence elections at all 
levels through financial donation in order to realize their 
political goals.
4.4  Think Tank
Researchers  o f  th ink  tank  normal ly  have  r i ch 
administrative experience and solid research strength, as 
well as strong social resources. They play a crucial role 
in the decisions of the US legislation, administration and 
interest group.
From the analysis above, we can see that because 
of the special political system and decision-making 
mechanisms, the decisions of the US strategy toward 
China are actually results of the process in which different 
stakeholders restrict and compromise with each other and 
finally reach a balance (Guo, 2014). This brings more 
uncertainty to the political risks of Chinese enterprises’ 
investment in US.
5.  RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL 
RISKS OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES’ 
INVESTMENT IN THE US
As the largest developed country and the largest 
developing country, the US and China has different yet 
complementary natural resources and industrial levels 
in the long run, which can create a broad space for their 
investment (Zeng, 2012).
Over the years there is a serious imbalance existing 
in Foreign Balance Sheet of China and the US. The US 
foreign investments mainly concentrate on the high-
yield risk assets, and its ROI on China maintains about 
20% for a long time. In contrast, China’s reserve assets 
are mainly for purchase of US Treasury bonds, and 
the average ROI is less than 5%, which is to exchange 
high-yield equity assets for low-yield assets. Interests’ 
allocation is severely asymmetry. To settle the imbalance 
of interests’ allocation, the best way is to change China’s 
asset and liability structure, turning debt investments 
into equity investments. Meanwhile, after the financial 
crisis, Obama wanted the US economy to transform from 
debt-dependence into “Industrial recycling”. Technical 
innovation, developing new resource and nurturing new 
industries all require large-scale investments, including 
China’s. The transformation will not only solve US 
structural problem of “jobless growth”, but also boost the 
US economic restructuring. The US certainly hopes that 
large-scale investment from China and other emerging 
economies will have larger spillover effects on the US 
economy (Zhang, 2012).
For Chinese enterprises, foreign investment and 
multinational business is still in its infancy, and investors 
are also not mature enough. There is a huge gap between 
Chinese multinational enterprises’ financial strength, 
technology, management skills and those of developed 
countries. We must make suitable policies according to 
the world’s political and economic situation, specific 
domestic conditions and multinational enterprises’ actual 
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situation, thereby avoiding possible political risks and 
increasing the revenue of China’s foreign investment (Nie, 
2011).
(1) Strengthen the introduction of the bilateral 
investment agreements. In the sixth round of China-US 
strategic and economic dialogue, the two sides agreed to 
seek to reach agreement in 2014 on the core issues and 
the main provisions of the bilateral investment treaties, 
and promised an early start in 2015 negotiations on the 
negative list. And the US promised that it will maintain an 
open environment to all kinds of Chinese investment.
(2) China and the US need to strengthen bilateral 
exchanges and cooperation not only between the central 
governments, but also between local governments and 
between cities in particular. Especially for Chinese 
investment, the US state government and municipal 
government have greater impact. In the US federal 
government, every state has different investment policies. 
Meanwhile, China and the US need to strengthen mutual 
understanding and cooperation of each other’s regulatory 
oversight, such as cooperation in accounting standards, 
and to enhance cooperation on some new issues (Lu, 
2014).
(3) Strengthen exchanges with US Congress, political 
parties, administration and other relevant departments, and 
enhance cooperation with interest groups. Also, strengthen 
mutual understanding and agreement to enhance and 
deepen the China-US strategic partnership.
(4) Adopt a flexible international investment strategy, 
and build a solid foundation for risk control. In the process 
of direct investment in US, companies can effectively 
avoid the US political risks by adopting flexible strategies 
on production, sales, technology and financing. First, 
production strategy. Chinese enterprises can put raw 
materials and spare parts in subsidiaries in different 
countries, which will not only help to ensure sources and 
quality of inputs, but also avoid the US government’s 
control, thereby effectively reducing political risks. 
Second, marketing strategy. On the basis of maintaining 
the US target market needs, targeting the market to the 
whole country. Third, technology strategy. Avoid the US 
key technology review and export controls by technical 
process. Fourth, financing strategy. Chinese investors can 
increase the proportion of financing in the US, or make 
diversified financing (Nie, 2011).
(5) Strengthen communication and public relations 
with the US departments which can influence Chinese 
enterprises’ investment in the US by inviting them to 
make them understand the operation system of Chinese 
enterprises. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises should 
keep in touch with local expertise of politics, business, 
investment, law, union and community. Also, Chinese 
enterprises should choose partner with good social 
activity, or hire professional PR team to assist public 
relations, an in particular enhance communication with 
the US Congress in order to boost deeper strategic 
cooperation between the US and China.
(6) Under the premise of ensuring state-owned 
enterprises owned absolutely by the government, the 
mixed-economic reform of enterprises with other 
background should be accelerated. In terms of mergers 
and acquisitions, Chinese state-owned enterprises 
should clearly highlight its subjectivity and enhance the 
commercial attributes of trade, and avoid normal business 
activities to be demonized as a political or military 
activity under Chinese government control (Liu, 2012). At 
the same time, Chinese enterprises can make Greenfield 
investments in the US in advance, do mergers and 
acquisitions in accordance with CFIUS national security 
review, and make risk prevention on activities which may 
be regarded as coordinated strategy.
(7) Mergers and acquisitions mainly take place in the 
form of holding shares and avoid whole-acquisitions. 
Meanwhile, acquisitions can be done in areas such as 
consumption and selling, and avoid those related with 
national security.
(8)  Improve China’s  image,  and take global 
responsibility as much as possible. And while using 
properly China’s massive foreign reserves, China should 
accelerate diversified investment and seize the historical 
opportunity of the US industrial reconstruction and 
economic revitalization.
CONCLUSION
With the accelerating economic globalization and 
strengthening China-US interaction, there is a huge space 
for their economic and trade cooperation, and Chinese 
enterprises have strong potential to invest in the US. This 
is not only an economic issue, but a political issue worth 
serious consideration which requires stakeholders to face 
China-US political, economic and cultural environment, 
to avoid politicizing simple business practices, and 
meanwhile to improve the main structure and legal and 
accounting system, thereby making favorable policies for 
Chinese enterprises to invest in the US and reducing the 
political risks.
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